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Chapter 12
Going Private in the Public Sector
The Transition from Defined Benefit
to Defined Contribution Pension Plans
Douglas Fore

The transition from private sector defined benefit to defined contribution
pension plans has been underway in the United States for over a quartercentury, since the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in 1974 and especially since the introduction of 401(k) accounts in
1982. By contrast, in the state and local government sector, pensions have
been and continue to be overwhelmingly defined benefit in type, perhaps
because ERISA does not apply to these plans. Additional factors contributing to the continuation of public sector defined benefit pensions likely
include the relatively high degree of unionization of state and local government employees, and the fact that early retirement features commonly
associated with defined benefit plans have meshed well with many public
employer personnel goals in the past.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that the public sector pension environment is beginning to evolve. A small but growing number of state and local
governments have switched or are contemplating switching from a defined
benefit to a defined contribution plan. If these pioneers prove successful, in
terms of employee and employer satisfaction, the public sector may follow
the transition trend experienced in the private sector over the last quartercentury. If this transition process spreads, it will mark a major shift in the way
in which retirement income is provided for a substantial number of American workers and retirees. And if more state and local government pension
plans transition to a defined contribution format, this could potentially have
a profound impact on capital markets, given the substantial size of public
pension assets.
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Key Aspects of Public Sector Defined Benefit Pensions
As noted elsewhere in this volume, public pension benefit formulas vary
widely within a state, and between states. My goal here is to highlight several
issues pertinent to the public sector transition from defined benefit (DB) to
defined contribution (DC) pension plans. I focus on benefit formulas, coverage and vesting rules, and funding patterns, derived from data contained
in the PENDAT97 survey described above (see Hustead and Mitchell this
volume; Zorn 1997, 1998).
Vesting requirements of public DB plans. Vesting refers to how long an employee must work to earn a legal right to an eventual retirement benefit
under a plan. In public sector DB plans, a worker is generally vested after
either five or ten years of employment; just under half of all plans vest employees after five years, with a similar percentage vesting after ten years.
Only a very few plans grant pension rights immediately, and likewise few
delay vesting for more than ten years. It should be noted that one plan can
have different vesting rules for workers hired at different points in time, as
well as different benefit rules. Eligibility for non-duty-related disability and
survivors benefits typically requires the same vesting period as for pension
benefits; duty-related disability and survivors benefits generally vest immediately, although some plans do require the same vesting period as for pension
rights.
DB plan benefitformulas. Public pension benefit formulas vary widely within
a state, and also between states (Hustead and Mitchell this volume). But despite this diversity, retirement benefits are calculated as a percentage offinal
average salary in most defined benefit plans. Final average salary may be defined as the worker's salary in the last year of employment, or an average of
the last three or five years of work. Many plans also establish minimum age
and service requirements (e.g., fifty years of age and twenty years of employment) in order to qualify for a pension with full credit for accrued benefits; these are commonly associated with police and fire department plan
criteria.
Benefit accrual patterns for public employees covered/not covered by social security appear in Figure 1. Corresponding pension benefits received
after 30 years of service, as a percentage of final average salary, are given in
Figure 2. In the California State Teachers' Retirement System (calsters), employees accrue benefits at a constant 2.0 percent per year, which happens to
be the average annual benefit accrual rate for all public sector workers. In
1996, the average DB benefit for state and local government workers covered
by social security and with thirty years of service was 57.8 percent of final
average salary; for workers not covered by social security, it was 68.5 percent
of final average salary.
Constant-rate accrual of benefits appears to be the exception rather than
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the norm, however, in the public sector. Most public DB plans have differential accrual rates, usually on either side of twenty years of service. For example, the Alaska Teachers' Retirement System benefit accrual rate is 2.0
percent of final average service for the first 20 years of service, and 2.5 percent per year thereafter. By contrast, the City of Fresno Employees' Retirement System accrual rate is 2.0 percent of final average salary for the first
twenty-five years, then falls to 1. 0 percent per year thereafter. Some teachers,
school employees, and general employees in public DB plans not covered
by social security have annual benefit accrual rates rise by 0.30-0.40 percent per year of service on average, but plans for workers not covered by
social security do provide lower benefit accrual rates. For example, workers
in the California Public Employee Retirement System (Calpers)-who are
not in social security-accrue benefits at a constant 1.25 percent per year;
their resulting pension equalling only 37.50 percent of final average salary
after thirty years of service, the lowest level of benefits offered by any major
public plan in the country. This relatively low benefit level provided by Calpers may explain why many counties and municipalities in California have
established their own distinct plans with different DB formulas.
Benefit formula design in the public sector appears to be motivated by
three factors, the most important of which appears to be whether or not
the employee group is covered by social security. Only a minority of plans
covering workers covered by social security explicitly integrate their benefit formulas with expected social security benefits by, for example, offering
higher benefit accrual rates for salary ranges above the social security earnings threshold. It must also be acknowledged that about a quarter of state
and local government employees are not covered by social security; nevertheless as ofl983, state and local governments no longer have the option of
opting out of social security.l In any event, as noted above, workers outside
the social security system have more generous benefit accrual formulas than
do workers included in social security. A second apparent factor in benefit
formula design has to do with the employee group covered: local government plans are almost always more generous than state plans. For example,
the accrual rate in the City of San Jose Federated City Employees' Retirement System is a flat 2.5 percent per year of final average salary, so a worker
with thirty years of service would retire with a benefit of 75 percent of final
average salary. This is double the benefit of an otherwise similar employee
in the state-level Calpers plan. A third factor influencing public plan design
is public employee unions, which tend to bargain over pension accrual rates
with state and local governments.
DB planfunding status. The U.S. Government Accounting Standards Board
has required state and local government pension plans to compute liabilities using a common set of methods to produce a pension benefit obligation
(PBO) figure for each plan since 1987. In practice, public pension plan ad-
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ministrators have wide latitude in terms of the assumptions used for future
real salary increases and turnover rates, as well as future inflation and investment income return rates (Hustead this volume). As Mitchell and Smith
(1994) note, the spread between expected investment returns and the expected growth rates of employee compensation is equal to the real discount
rate of future pension liabilities, and a larger gap implies a lower present
value offuture liabilities. Mitchell and Smith found funding status in public
DB plans negatively related to the degree ofemployee unionization and state
fiscal pressure, and they also found persistence in past funding patterns.
Public sector defined benefit plans are fairly well funded in the 1990s
(Mitchell et al. this volume), but plan funding status varies according to
plan type. For example, when we compare teacher/school employee plans,
police and fire department plans, and general plans, we find that the general
plans have the highest funding ratios and teacher/school employee plans the
lowest (in the case of teacher/school employee plans, roughly a third have
funding ratios below 70 percent). This is depicted in Figure 3. Where public
plans are less than fully funded, the amount is substantial: the mean time to
amortization of the unfunded liability is approximately twenty-three years
at current funding rates. We find no correlation between a state's per capita
income or tax burden and the funding status of its defined benefit plans
in the 1996 data. 2 This is perhaps surprising, because different patterns of
state income and population growth generate different incentives in terms
of funding levels. For example, rapidly growing sun-belt states and municipalities might be expected to underfund their plans relative to slowly growing Northern states. States attracting large numbers of migrants, whether
from within or without the United States, might experience more rapid
growth in their tax bases than in their actuarially accrued pension liabilities. In this case, DB plan underfunding might be anticipated, since rapid
tax base growth could amortize unfunded actuarial liability without changing tax rates. Conversely, states and municipalities with static or declining
tax bases have an incentive to fully fund or overfund their plans in order to
avoid very large tax increases at some point in the future.
DB plans and mobility within a state. Public pension DB plans diverge concerning how readily they permit employees to transfer their pension rights
to other public sector DSB plans within the same state. Roughly a third of
these pension plans have reciprocal agreements with other plans in the same
state for transferring or combining worker benefit rights accrued elsewhere.
Where reciprocal agreements do not exist, employees may still have the
option of transferring service credits. For example, roughly 40 percent of
plans allow veterans to purchase service credits for military service at either
full cost or less than full cost. Table 1 shows the matrix of options available to
employees. Approximately 60 percent of all public defined benefit plans disallow transfer of any accrued benefit rights across plans; furthermore, fewer
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TABLE 1.

Defined Benefit Plan Portability Method for Determining Purchase of
Service Credits Earned Elsewhere

Less than
Type of service
State government
Local government
Out-of-state government
Federal government
Military
Other

Full cost

Full cost

No cost

Purchase
not allowed

22%
27%
15%
14%
24%
12%

15%
14%
6%
8%
23%
5%

4%
2%
1%
1%
6%
0%

59%
57%
78%
77%
47%
82%

Source: Author's calculations from PENDAT97 database.

than 20 percent of plans allow workers to purchase service credits earned
in either the federal government or other state governments. Plans which
do permit employees to purchase service credits are approximately twice as
likely to require them to purchase credits at full cost rather than at less than
full cost.
DB pension plans' impact on mobility more generally. Lack of portability is one
of the well-known drawbacks to defined benefit pension plans. Under a defined benefit pension regime, workers who stay with the same employer
retire with larger pensions than similarly compensated workers in similar
defined benefit schemes who change employers over the course of their
careers. This can be illustrated with a simple numerical example where we
assume that pension rights are fully acquired after five years. Consider a
worker who begins employment at age 35 with a salary of $25,000, receives
annual raises of four percent, and retires at age 65. The worker faces two
alternative career path options. On the first path, the worker can remain
with the same employer for thirty years, accruing pension benefits at a rate
of 2 percent per year that are paid as a percentage of final salary. On the
second path, the worker quits his first job after either ten or twenty years.
The pension benefits earned under the two paths are shown in Table 2.
Remaining with the first employer until retirement at age 65 would produce an annual pension benefit corresponding to the first year's service of
$1,622, two percent of the last year's salary. The annual benefit corresponding to the first ten years of service would be $16,217. However, if the worker
quit after ten years, at age 45, the benefit eventually payable at age 65 from
the first employer would be only $7,401, corresponding to 2 percent ofsalary
at age 45 for each year of service to the time he quit. Discounted at a rate
of 6 percent for twenty years, the present value of the benefit received by
staying with the first employer is roughly $2,800 per year larger. This may
not seem to be much for a forty-five-year-old worker contemplating a job
switch, but at age 65 with expected longevity of twenty more years the future
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Impact ofJob Changes on Retirement Benefits in Defined Benefit
Pension Plans

age

Worker's
Salary

Benefit based on
current salary

35
45
55
65

$25,000
$37,006
$54,778
$81,085

$7,401
$21,911
$48,651

o

Benefit based on
final salary

$1,622
$16,217
$32,434
$48,651

Source: Author's calculations.

value of this benefit would be approximately $28,000 larger. A worker who
switched at age 55 after twenty years of service loses even more.
Several factors could exacerbate this benefit differential. For instance,
high inflation during the latter part of the worker's career could erode the
real value of the benefits accrued during prior years, and severely penalize
the worker who changes jobs. Additionally, if the benefit formula were back
loaded, so that the benefit accrual rate rises at some point (e.g., after twenty
years), then changing jobs would also be disproportionately penalized.
DB plan impacts on labor supply. Public DB pension benefit formulas influence older workers' labor supply decisions because of the very nonlinearity
of their structure.3 These plans generally permit early retirement as early as
age 55, although required service varies widely: some plans subsidize early
retirement by minimizing or even eliminating actuarial reductions for early
retirement, while other plans levy "full" or more than full reductions (i.e.,
over 5 or 6 percent) per year of retirement below age 60 or 65. Not surprisingly, plans covering police and fire department workers tend to have
the most liberal early retirement policies. Many of these plans do not specify a minimum retirement age, instead basing the availability of retirement
benefits on years of service. These provisions are presumably intended as a
means of shedding workers as their physical fitness declines. Hence police
and fire department workers may be able to retire with full or (partially)
actuarially reduced benefits at age 40, after twenty years of service. Since
many of these plans also offer workers the option of purchasing service credits for time spent in the military, many of these workers can earn significant
pension rights by their early 40s. This is analogous to the situation in the
federal government, where special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation can retire with full pensions at age 52 with twenty years of service,
and face mandatory retirement at age 55. Similarly, FBI agents receive full
credits for military or prior federal government service.
As mentioned above, benefit accrual patterns are ratherjagged, with some
plans front-loading benefits, others back loading, and still others offering
constant benefit accrual rates. Changes in the rate of benefit accrual are typi-
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cally service related, with changes after twenty years of service, and usually
not age related. Additionally, some plans cap benefits at a certain percentage
of final average salary. These differing benefit formulas would be expected
to impact the labor supply decisions of older workers at several points in
time. For example, where the plan does not call for actuarial reductions for
early retirement, we would expect to see a spike in retirement at the twenty
years of service mark for police and fire department workers, or at age 55
for other state and local government workers. We would expect to see similar spikes at the thirty years of service mark and especially at age 62, the age
when three-quarters of state and local government workers become eligible
for social security. Researching the empirical links between public plan retirement rates and benefit formulas is a task for future research.
Changes in benefit accrual rates after twenty years of service but before
thirty years are also intended to influence the retirement decision. In frontloaded plans, which typically reduce the accrual rate to one percent per year
of service after twenty or twenty-five years, employees have an incentive to
leave early. Similarly, plans with absolute caps on benefit replacement rates
are probably designed to stimulate older workers' withdrawal. This would be
expected for the Fire and Police Pension Fund of San Antonio, where plan
members are not covered by social security; the benefit accrual rate is 2.0
percent of final average salary for the first twenty years, 4.0 percent for years
21-25, 3.5 percent for years 26-30, and then a modest 1.0 percent of final
average salary for each additional year of service past thirty years.4
These patterns of benefit accrual rates parallel those of private-sector employers who also tend to want to induce retirement after twenty to thirty
years of employment. For instance Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier
(1994) show that private DB plans offering subsidized early retirement increased dramatically between 1960 and 1980. The observed heterogeneity
in benefit formulas also suggests endogeneity in public plan design. It must
also be acknowledged that it is more difficult to fire or layoff a worker with
many years of service in the public sector, versus in the private sector. In
this light, DB plans offering early retirement incentives provide a substitute method ofdischarging lower productivity employees. We also recognize
that some employers prefer incentive provisions that tie workers to their
jobs, especially workers receiving specialized training such as police and fire
department personnel and teachers. And for safety workers in particular,
early retirement provisions are important to employers where worker productivity may be expected to eventually decline due to physical demands.
The manner in which employee and employer contributions are credited
with interest can also impact retirement and mobility decisions. Approximately three-fourths of public DB pension plans currently credit employee
contributions with interest.5 Of those plans that do this, roughly 60 percent
use interest rates greater than or equal to 5 percent. Of course, contribu-
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tions would still compound relatively slowly for most employees at the nominal risk-free interest rate or below. Even where pensions are portable within
the public sector of a state, limits on pension accumulations would deter
mobility in cases where service credits must be purchased.
There have recently been a variety of legislative proposals introduced,
with the aim of increasing portability among different types of pension
plans. Most aspects of these proposals refer to DC plans. For example, one
proposal would permit rollovers between 401(k) and 403(b) plans which
are disallowed under current law. Specifically, this would allow workers with
403(b) and 457 plan assets to use those assets for the purchase of service
credits in public sector DB plans. Another proposal allows rollovers from
IRAs to defined contribution and defined benefit plans.

The Transition to Defined Contribution Pensions
There are several appealing aspects about DC plans in the public sector. We
enumerate these next.
Defined contribution pensions and 17Wbility. When contemplating a job offer,
prospective employees must form expectations about job tenure and eventual pension benefits, among other factors. The decision matrix can be expected to vary with the worker's age at time of employment, expected date
of retirement, and degree of risk aversion. Younger workers, in particular,
may expect to change employers multiple times over the course of their
careers, particularly in light of evidence that there has been a trend toward
increased employment mobility between the 1980s and the 1990s. For instance,Jaeger and Stevens (1998) report a statistically significant increase in
the probability of employees having fewer than ten years ofjob tenure, over
time.
In this environment, defined benefit plans become substantially less attractive, especially those with ten-year vesting periods, and DC plans have
increased appeal when long job tenure is not expected due to their enhanced portability. Employee contributions vest immediately, and employer
contributions usually vest either immediately or after a wait of one year (a
few require vesting periods of up to five years). Employees who change jobs
and move from one DC plan to another face only the potential loss of pension rights of nonvested employer contributions. Furthermore, DC pension
rights are neutral with respect to job tenure. Thus workers with vested rights
in a DB plan who leave the firm after five to ten years see their pension benefits frozen in nominal terms based on their salaries at that time, but similar
workers with DC plans continue to accumulate interest income, dividends,
and capital gains in their pension portfolios.
Of course, to receive the benefits of tax deferral, employees who change
jobs and pension plans must either roll their DC balances into new DC plans,
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or else leave their original balances untouched to accumulate over time.
There is evidence that many workers take partial or full lump-sum distributions from their plans when changing jobs and use the proceeds for investment in housing assets, consumer durables, or immediate consumption
(Samwick and Skinner 1996). Restrictions on rollovers between different
types of defined contribution plans may well contribute to this phenomenon. Under current law, rollovers are not allowed from 401(k) to 403(b)
plans or in the other direction from 403(b) to 401(k) plans. Currently, service credits cannot be purchased with defined contribution plan assets.
Defined contribution pensions and investment risk. In state and local DB plans,
taxpayers of each jurisdiction bear two types of investment risk. (Participants do bear default risk, but in the United States, this risk is seen to be
low in comparison to the risks borne by taxpayers). First, they bear the risk
of underfunding, which could necessitate a higher tax burden. Taxpayers
could avoid this risk by moving to another jurisdiction in advance of the
future tax increase, but this works only if they move to an area with a betterfunded plan. Second, taxpayers face the risk that the DB plan assets will
generate inadequte investment performance, again producing a need for
higher taxes. Conversely, taxpayers enjoy the upside risk that if investment
performance and funding progress are greater than expected, resulting in
overfunding of the plan, future contributions may be reduced. 6
In DC plans, of course, investment risk is borne by plan participants, in
exchange for which they receive flexibility in terms of investment choice.
This flexibility permits individuals to tailor their portfolios in accordance
with their time and risk preferences. While the appeal of a DC approach
is obvious, there remains the concern that financially unsophisticated participants may choose portfolios either too conservative or too risky, putting
retirement income security in jeopardy. It should also be said that there is
no a priori reason to believe that DC plans automatically offer a menu of
choices suitable for the varied tastes of plan participants, since investment
choices available in defined contribution plans vary widely.
The appeal of DC investment options has been pointed out in a recent
study offaculty pension plan choices by Clark, Harper, and Pitts (1997), who
examined the choices of new faculty hires at North Carolina State University. These faculty members were given the option ofjoining either the state
government defined benefit plan, or one of three defined contribution plans
includingTIAA-CREF. Over the subsequent five-year period (1990-94),75
percent chose TIAA-CREF, 17 percent chose the DB plan, and 8 percent
chose one of the other two defined contribution plans.
Defined contribution pensions and labor supply. One key way in which DC plans
influence labor supply concerns the interaction between duration of coverage and total accumulations. Older workers continue to receive the same
interest accruals on their account balances as do younger workers, subject to
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portfolio composition. Unlike defined benefit plans, with their reductions
in benefit accrual rates after a set number of years of service, or explicit caps
on benefits, defined contribution plans have no early retirement incentives.
Indeed, as total accumulations continue to accrue with compound interest, employees may have a strong incentive to work longer in order to enjoy
higher incomes in retirement. However, once total accumulations are such
that retirement income security is assured, employees must then weigh the
tradeoffs of continued employment against their desire for leisure.

Trends to DC Pensions at the State Level
As noted above, several states recently introduced DC pensions for particular groups of employees, and more states are studying the idea of making the
transition from defined benefit to defined contribution plans. Several factors prompt the increased interest. One is term limits: in states where legislators face limitations on tenure in office, standard DB plans do not provide
the legislators with retirement income security. Indeed, this is the main reason why the state of Colorado switched to a defined contribution plan for its
state legislators in 1998. A second motivation is the desire to shift risk from
the taxpayers to employees; this is related to the goal of cutting total pension
contributions and the state's total pension cost burden. Another rationale
is the desire of state and local government employees for superior pension
portability and investment choice, linked to private employee enthusiasm
for investing in 401(k) plans.
Several state and local governments sponsor DC pensions as either their
sole plan or as a supplement to their DB plan. In Colorado, in addition to
the legislators' defined contribution plan, several municipalities offer defined contribution plans as the only pension plan. In Michigan, newly hired
state and local government employees (excluding teachers K-12) may join
a defined contribution plan; existing employees were offered the choice of
staying in the DB plan or switching to the DC plan. The state of Washington offers a hybrid defined benefit/defined contribution plan. The state of
Indiana has a defined contribution supplement to its defined benefit plan
for teachers, consisting of 3 percent of salary. Growing interest in making
a transition from defined benefit to defined contribution plans is reflected
in the number of state legislatures where bills have been introduced to enable the transition. Legislation is currently under consideration in Florida,
Georgia, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.'
The decision to switch from DB to DC is often made in the context of a
funding discussion. Ceteris paribus, making the transition is easier when a
plan is fully funded or overfunded. The closer a plan becomes to a pay-a!tyou-go system, and the greater the unfunded actuarial liability, the more
expensive the transition and the lower the probability that taxpayers will
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choose to bear the burden of transition. For example, in Michigan when the
new defined contribution plan was introduced, legislation was passed that
explicitly stated that K-12 employees could not make the transition until the
$3 billion plus unfunded liability of the Michigan Public School Employees
Retirement System was erased by December 31, 1997. The liability was not
paid off and K-12 employees do not, as yet, have the option of a defined
contribution plan. If plan sponsors overestimate the public plan's actuarial
liability, perhaps because expectations of future inflation are too high, then
the funding status of the plan will be better than it seems at first glance and
the transition will seem easier. For instance, some plan administrators are
using long-term inflation assumptions in excess of 4 percent, which probably gives an overly pessimistic view of the growth of future liabilities.

When to Stay and When to Go in Defined Benefit Plans
One method of making the transition between a defined benefit to a defined
contribution plan is to grandfather existing employees in the old DB system and move new employees into a new DC scheme. This eases the administrative burden, but does not benefit current employees, especially those
with limited tenure, who may wish to participate in the defined contribution plan. One way in which costs could be reduced in a transition is if employees assign a high value to the portability, investment choice, immediate
vesting, and other features offered by the DC plan. In this case, employees
might be willing to accept a lower expected value of future benefits in return for the other advantages of a defined contribution plan. A closer analysis of such trade-offs is facilitated using a simulation model that computes
the expected future benefits from either staying in a defined benefit plan
or switching to a defined contribution plan after five, ten, fifteen, or twenty
years of coverage in a defined benefit plan. First, we assume that the worker
begins employment at age 35 with a starting salary of $25,000. The worker
receives annual real wage increases of 1.0, 1.5, or 2.0 percent per year. In the
DB plan, pension rights are vested after five years of service. Defined benefit
pension rights accrue at 1.5, 1.75, 2.0, or 2.25 percent per year. In the DC
plan, the overall employee and employer contribution rate is 10.0, 12.5, or
15.0 percent of salary. The investment portfolio in the DC plan is assumed
to be 60 percent equities and 40 percent long-term U.S. Treasury bonds,
returning 1926-97 historical average real returns of 7.2 and 2.0 percent,
respectively (Siegel 1998). The real annual portfolio return is accordingly
5.12 percent. Workers who leave the defined benefit plan with vested rights
after five, ten, fifteen, or twenty years of service have their eventual defined
benefit pension rights valued based on their nominal salaries at that time.
Workers who retire at age 65 in the defined benefit plan have their pension
rights valued based on the salary at age 65. Workers who transition to the
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defined contribution plan eventually receive two pensions. The first is based
on their accrued defined benefit rights as of the date they elected to make
the transition. The second is based on their final defined contribution accumulations. These accumulations are the basis for a single life annuity based
on TIAA annuity rates as ofJune 1998 that pays a monthly amount of$759
per $100,000 accumulation (Poterba and Warshawsky 1999).
Given these assumptions, we compute the pensions received under the
different assumed accrual rates and investment return patterns. The annual
pension benefit for a worker who elects to transition to a DC plan after five
years of service in a DB plan appear in Table 3. The table shows the importance of high contribution rates in the DC plan. When the contribution rate
is 12.5 percent transition is favorable under most combinations of real wage
growth and defined benefit accrual rates. However, if the contribution rate
is 15.0 percent, then transition is unambiguously favorable under all states
except one. Conversely, if the contribution rate is lower, at 10.0 percent,
transition generates higher retirement incomes under only a few states.
The simulations also show the interaction of real wage growth with both
DB and DC accumulations. For example, in Table 3, when real wage growth
is 2.0 percent per year DB pensions after thirty years are higher with accrual
rates of 1.75 percent per year than when benefit accrual rates are 2.25 percent per year but real wage growth is only 1. 0 percent per year. Similarly, DC
accumulations and subsequent annuity payments are an increasing function
of real wage growth and contribution rates. Of the two factors contribution
rates are more important for parameter values used in these simulations.
Projected DB and DC pension payments if an employee transitions to a DC
plan after ten years are shown in Table 4. For mid-range contribution rates
of 12.5 percent transition results in unambiguously higher incomes only for
low rates of real wage growth and defined benefit accrual. If the contribution
rate is 10.0 percent then transition results in lower simulated incomes in all
states. However, if the contribution rate is 15.0 percent transition produces
higher projected incomes in more than half of the real wage growth/defined
benefit accrual states.
Simulation results for transition after fifteen years are shown in Table 5. If
the contribution rate is 12.5 percent then transition generates higher retirement income only if real wage growth is 1.0 percent and the benefit accrual
rate is 1.5 percent. However, if the contribution rate is 15.0 percent then
transition results in higher incomes regardless of real wage growth if the defined benefit accrual rate is 1.50 percent. If the accrual rate is 1.75 percent
then transition produces higher income if real wage growth is 1.0 percent,
and approximately equal income if real wage growth is 1.50 percent. Transition after twenty years results in lower expected incomes given parameter
values simulated here. 8
Two other significant factors are involved in the determination of pension

TABLE 3. Transition Mter Five Years in Defined Benefit Plan: Results From Real Simulation
Real wage gain 1.5%
contribution rates of

Real wage gain 1.0%
contribution rates of

Real wage gain 2.0%
contribution rates of

DB plan accrual rate

10%

12.50%

15%

10%

12.50%

15%

10%

12.50%

15%

DC pension
DB benefit
Combined
1.50% DB pension
DC pension
DB benefit
Combined
1.75% DB pension
DC pension
DB benefit
Combined
2.00% DB pension
DC pension
DB benefit
Combined
2.25% DB pension

14,457
1,971
16,427

18,071
1,971
20,041
15,163
18,071
2,299
20,370
17,690
18,071
2,628
20,698
20,218
18,071
2,956
21,027
22,745

21,685
1,971
23,655

15,601
2,020
17,621

23,401
2,020
25,421

16,851
2,070
18,921

15,601
2,357
17,957

23,401
2,357
25,757

16,851
2,415
19,266

21,685
2,628
24,312

15,601
2,693
18,294

23,401
2,693
26,094

16,851
2,760
19,611

21,685
2,956
24,641

15,601
3,030
18,630

23,401
3,030
26,431

16,851
3,105
19,956

21,064
2,070
23,134
20,378
21,064
2,415
23,479
23,774
21,064
2,760
23,824
27,170
21,064
3,105
24,169
30,567

25,276
2,070
27,347

21,685
2,299
23,984

19,501
2,020
21,521
17,585
19,501
2,357
21,857
20,515
19,501
2,693
22,194
23,446
19,501
3,030
22,531
26,377

14,457
2,299
16,756
14,457
2,628
17,084
14,457
2,956
17,413

Source: Author's calculations.

25,276
2,415
27,692
25,276
2,760
28,037
25,276
3,105
28,382

TABLE 4. Transition After Ten Years in Defined Benefit Plan: Results From Real Simulation
Real wage gain 1.5 %
contribution rates of

Real wage gain 1.0%
contribution rates of

Real wage gain 2.0%
contribution rates of

DB plan accrual rate

10%

12.50%

15%

10%

12.50%

15%

10%

12.50%

15%

DC pension
DB benefit
Combined
1.50% DB pension
DC pension
DB benefit
Combined
1.75% DB pension
DC pension
DB benefit
Combined
2.00% DB pension
DC pension
DB benefit
Combined
2.25% DB pension

10,404
4,142
14,546

13,005
4,142
17,147
15,163
13,005
4,833
17,838
17,690
13,005
5,523
18,528
20,218
13,005
6,213
19,219
22,745

15,606
4,142
19,748

11,407
4,352
15,759

17,111
4,352
21,463

12,512
4,571
17,083

11,407
5,077
16,484

17,111
5,077
22,188

12,512
5,333
17,845

15,606
5,523
21,129

11,407
5,803
17,210

17,111
5,803
22,913

12,512
6,095
18,607

15,606
6,213
21,820

11,407
6,528
17,935

17,111
6,528
23,639

12,512
6,857
19,369

15,640
4,571
20,211
20,378
15,640
5,333
20,973
23,774
15,640
6,095
21,735
27,170
15,640
6,857
22,497
30,567

18,768
4,571
23,339

15,606
4,833
20,439

14,259
4,352
18,611
17,585
14,259
5,077
19,336
20,515
14,259
5,803
20,062
23,446
14,259
6,528
20,787
26,377

10,404
4,833
15,237
10,404
5,523
15,927
10,404
6,213
16,618

Source: Author's calculations.

18,768
5,333
24,101
18,768
6,095
24,863
18,768
6,857
25,625

TABLE 5. Transition Mter Fifteen Years In Defined Benefit Plan: Results From Real Simulation
Real wage gain 1.5 %
contribution rates of

Real wage gain 1.0%
contribution rates of

Real wage gain 2.0%
contribution rates of

DB plan aarual rate

10%

12.50%

15%

10%

12.50%

15%

10%

12.50%

15%

DC pension
DB benefit
Combined
1.50% DB pension
DC pension
DB benefit
Combined
1.75% DB pension
DC pension
DB benefit
Combined
2.00% DB pension
DC pension
DB benefit
Combined
2.25% DB pension

7,086
6,530
13,616

8,857
6,530
15,388
15,163
8,857
7,619
16,476
17,690
8,857
8,707
17,565
20,218
8,857
9,796
18,653
22,745

10,629
6,530
17,159

7,888
7,033
14,920

11,831
7,033
18,864

8,780
7,571
16,350

7,888
8,205
16,092

11,831
8,205
20,036

8,780
8,832
17,612

10,629
8,707
19,336

7,888
9,377
17,264

11,831
9,377
21,208

8,780
10,094
18,874

10,629
9,796
20,424

7,888
10,549
18,436

11,831
10,549
22,380

8,780
11,356
20,136

10,975
7,571
18,545
20,378
10,975
8,832
19,807
23,774
10,975
10,094
21,069
27,170
10,975
11,356
22,331
30,567

13,170
7,571
20,740

10,629
7,619
18,248

9,860
7,033
16,892
17,585
9,860
8,205
18,064
20,515
9,860
9,377
19,236
23,446
9,860
10,549
20,408
26,377

7,086
7,619
14,705
7,086
8,707
15,793
7,086
9,796
16,882

Source: Author's calculations.

13,170
8,832
22,002
13,170
10,094
23,264
13,170
11,356
24,526
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incomes in these nonstochastic simulations. One is inflation, which erodes
the value of the nominal pension benefit earned at the time of transition
and may depress nominal investment returns as well. However, where the
DB pension formula is computed using final salary, employees are protected
until the time of retirement or transition. Income security in retirement is
then dependent on the manner in which benefits are indexed, if at all. The
second significant factor is the option value of switching to a DC plan. For
example, consider the case of an employee in a DB plan, accruing pension
rights at the rate of 2.0 percent per year, with real wage growth of 1.50 percent per year, offered the opportunity to switch to a DC plan after five years
of coverage under the DB plan. In Table 3 this employee'S eventual benefit
under the DB plan is $23,446. Assuming a contribution rate of 12.50 percent in the DC plan, and with the small benefit earned under the DB plan,
the table gives the eventual pension as $22,194.
Should the employee make the transition or not? That depends on the
value the employee assigns to the DC "call option." The value of the option
is a positive function of the value to the employee of the advantages such as
portability and investment choice offered by the DC plan. Younger workers,
in particular, would be expected to prefer DC plans. Additionally, the option
value of DC plans would be a positive function of time until retirement.
Younger workers can also bear more risk, and may have the ability in DC
plans to choose riskier portfolios, with higher expected returns than in the
generally conservative simulations shown here. Therefore under reasonable
parameters the value of the option would be such that employees would prefer to make the transition to a DC plan even if the simulations show that the
transition would result in somewhat smaller incomes in retirement.
The impact of attitudes toward risk on the transition choice is unclear. An
extremely risk-averse employee may prefer the status quo and the expected
certainty of an eventual DB pension. But at least in the private sector, many
employers are converting from conventional DB to cash balance pension
plans, a change that may reduce eventual pension benefits of older workers.
In the public sector, conventional DB plans may appear more secure, but
a jurisdiction which experiences severe fiscal pressure may feel compelled
to cut pension contributions and hence future benefits for current workers.
Additionally, the DC plan offers control over asset allocation, which often
appeals to employees regardless of risk preferences.

Conclusions
Several issues arise when considering the transition from defined benefit
to defined contribution pensions in the state and local government sector.
While DB plans offer many advantages, a recent trend to DC plans in several
public sector contexts suggests that the private sector trend may be spread-
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ing to the public sector. We show that the appeal of moving from DB to
DC pensions is partly due to the very different retirement wealth accumulations under the two plan types, such that under many transition scenarios, a
worker would have greater retirement income security in a DC than in a DB
plan. For those who value the option, employers may be able to induce employees to switch pension plans in a way that saves public plan employersand taxpayers - money in the long run. The cost savings would come from
paying only small future DB pensions to employees who switch, as opposed
to large DB pensions based on final average salary to those who stay. Hence
a transition option in which employees choose whatever plan was in their
best interest might actually lower employer costs while improving employee
welfare. Calculating the option value of transitioning from a DB to a DC plan
is a direction for future research.

Notes
1. Jurisdictions outside social security generally oppose proposals to include them
in the system, for fear it would have an adverse impact on plan funding status.
2. This conclusion is based on the author's perusal of PENDAT97 survey results.
3. Data from Europe suggest that early retirement benefit patterns strongly induce
early retirement (Gruber and Wise 1999), and in the United States, Costa (1998)
shows that eligibility for reduced and full social security benefits produce upward
spikes in retirement rates at ages 62 and 65.
4. Front-loaded plans too may be designed to influence the date of retirement. For
example, workers in the Illinois Downstate and Suburban Police Fund (who are not
included in social security), have an accrual rate of2.5 percent of final average salary
during the first 20 years of service, falling to 2.0 percent per year from years 21-30,
and then falling again to 1.0 percent per year after 30 years of service. Conversely,
back-loaded plans do not encourage early retirement, unless they have caps on the
maximum benefit replacement rate that can be earned. However, back-loaded plans
often have fairly ungenerous benefit formulae. For example, workers in the Teachers' Retirement System of Illinois plan have a benefit accrual rate of 1.67 percent
of final average salary during the first 10 years of employment, 1.9 percent per year
from years 11-20, 2.1 percent per year from years 21-30, and 2.3 percent per year
thereafter. Hence a worker retiring after 20 years of service at age 65 would receive
a benefit replacement rate of only 35.70 percent of final average salary. A worker retiring at age 65 with 30 years of service would receive a replacement rate of 56.70
percent of final average salary. Plan members are not covered by social security.
5. No data are available on whether and how employer contributions are credited
with interest.
6. Alternatively, unions may lobby for benefit increases.
7. Legislation in draft form also exists in Louisiana.
8. Simulations were also calculated with the following assumptions: The worker
begins employment at age 35 with a starting salary of $25,000 and a nominal wage
growth rate of 4.0 percent per year. In the DB plan, pension rights are vested after
5 years of service. In the DC plan, the overall employee and employer contribution
rate is 12.5 percent of salary. DB pension rights accrue at 1.5,1.75,2.0, or 2.25 percent per year. Investment returns in the DC plan are alternatively 3.0, 6.0, 7.5, 9.0,
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or 12.0 percent per year. Workers who leave the DB plan with vested rights after 5,
10, 15, or 20 years of service have their eventual DB pension rights valued based
on their nominal salaries at that time. Workers who retire at age 65 in the DB plan
have their pension rights valued based on their nominal salaries at that time. DC
accumulations are converted into an annuity as in the simulations described in the
text. These simulations generated results quite similar to those in the text. Details
are available from the author on request.
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